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INTRODUCTION 
At a young age, we are taught that the Bill of Rights, specifically 
the Second Amendment, gives each American citizen the general right 
to bear arms. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states that “a well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”
1
 Taking this at face value, most Americans never question 
exactly how far this right extends until they are forbidden from 
obtaining a license or persecuted for carrying a weapon in a prohibited 
area. In 2008, the United States Supreme Court, in District of Columbia 
v. Heller, acknowledged and confirmed this individual right to bear 
arms
2
 and further elaborated that statues banning handgun possession in 
one’s home for immediate self-defense violate the Second Amendment.
3
 
In 2010, the Supreme Court once again rallied behind the right to bear 
arms and concluded, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, that the Second 
Amendment is fully applicable to the states.
4
 The Heller and McDonald 
decisions declined to expressly determine whether their holdings limited 
the Second Amendment solely to self-defense in the home or whether 
the right could be extended to other places. 
As a result of the Court’s refusal to establish a standard for 
addressing Second Amendment challenges, lower courts continue to 
struggle over how far to extend an individual’s right to bear arms.
5
 
Proponents of gun rights have been challenging state and federal gun 
laws since 2008 and cases continue to line up for the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
6
 Although many gun rights activists believed that Heller and 
 
1 U.S. Const. amend. II. 
2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
3 Id. at 636. 
4 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3025 (2010). 
5 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Sept. 12, 
2011, at 2. 
6 Robert Barnes, Cases lining up to ask Supreme Court to clarify Second Amendment 
rights, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 14, 2011, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/cases-lining-up-to-ask-supreme-court-to-clarify-
second-amendment-rights/2011/08/11/gIQAioihFJ_story.html. 
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McDonald were tremendous victories for an individual’s right to gun 
possession, later decisions have not clarified Second Amendment rights, 
keeping gun activists on an overall losing streak in the lower courts.
7
 
While the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to confront the issue of 
Second Amendment rights outside of the home, state legislatures have 
taken a different approach than lower courts by enacting laws that tackle 
this challenging issue. Beginning in 2004, gun rights advocates such as 
the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) began lobbying state 
legislatures to establish laws that prohibit employers from maintaining 
gun-free workplace policies under the Federal Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970 (“OSH Act”).
8
 Since 2004, nineteen states have 
enacted these laws,
9
 commonly known as “Guns-at-Work” laws, which 
prohibit employers or business owners from forbidding the presence of 
otherwise legal guns in locked motor vehicles parked on business 
premises.
10
 
This Note argues that, because of the overwhelming need for 
clarification and state legislatures’ proactive stance, the U.S. Supreme 
Court needs to take an affirmative stance on the debate regarding how 
far the Second Amendment right to bear arms extends. The lobbying 
efforts of the NRA will continue to establish “Guns-at-Work” laws, as 
advocates continue to put pressure on state legislatures. Since Heller 
and McDonald sparked the debate over Second Amendment rights, 
cases have been piling up in the lower courts and legislatures have 
continued to step into the arena with their own interpretation of gun 
rights. With the disconnect between the state enactments and the lower 
court rulings, the Supreme Court must affirmatively decide, once and 
for all, whether the Second Amendment extends beyond the home. 
Part I of this Note discusses the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in 
Heller and McDonald by analyzing exactly which questions the Court 
answered and which standards they left open to interpretation. Part II 
 
7 Id. 
8 Neil D. Perry, Employer Firearm Policies: Parking Lots, State Laws, OSHA, and the 
Second Amendment, 20 EMPLOYMENT LAW COMMENTARY (Morrison & Foerster LLP, San 
Francisco, CA), no. 7, July 18, 2008 at 1. 
9 Joe Palazzolo, Gun Showdown at Work, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2012, 
http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324595904578123640080351414.ht
ml?mg=reno64-wsj. In the article, the author states that “about 20 states have passed so-
called parking-lot bills since 2004.” By looking at the map that is included in the article, one 
can see that 19 states have passed the bills and the author was rounding up to 20. 
10 Debra Witter, Individual Gun Rights, Gun Laws, and Franchising: Why Franchisors 
Cannot Ignore the Controversy, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 239, 240 (2010). 
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examines the lower court challenges that have inevitably emerged since 
the Supreme Court handed down its decisions in Heller and McDonald. 
Part III evaluates the different approaches that state legislatures have 
taken to the issue of Second Amendment rights. Finally, Part IV 
analyzes the stance that the Supreme Court needs to take in this ongoing 
litigation in order to conserve judicial resources. In the five years that 
have passed since the Heller decision in 2008, states have continued to 
proactively modify their laws to increase gun rights. The Supreme Court 
gave a limited definition of Second Amendment rights that spawned the 
increased litigation that we see today. The Supreme Court opened the 
door for such controversy over the right to bear arms, so it is the Court’s 
duty to determine how far these rights should extend. 
I. United States Supreme Court Second Amendment 
Jurisprudence 
The justices in Heller specifically stated that the Second 
Amendment does not allow an individual to carry a firearm for any 
reason and in any manner.
11
 The Court determined that individuals have 
a right to carry an assembled weapon in their homes for self-defense;
12
 
however, they noted that their opinion should not cast doubt on a 
specified group of gun prohibitions.
13
 As a follow up in McDonald, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment is fully 
applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
14
 
Although the Court had taken a proactive step to answer one of the 
unanswered questions from Heller, they refused to resolve the dispute 
over the breadth of the Second Amendment and the standard that should 
apply to Second Amendment litigation. 
A. District of Columbia v. Heller: Does the Individual Have 
the Right to Bear Arms? 
Since 1976, the District of Columbia had in place a gun control law 
that “banned the possession of handguns and required that all firearms 
kept in the home be trigger-locked or disassembled.”
15
 Initially, the 
Supreme Court in 2008 held that the Second Amendment gives an 
 
11 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
12 Id. at 635.  
13 Id 626-27. 
14 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088 (2010). 
15 Perry, supra note 8, at 5. 
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individual the right to keep and bear arms.
16
 Furthermore, the Court 
concluded that statutes such as the one in the District of Columbia, 
which ban possession of a gun in the home, are in direct violation of the 
Second Amendment.
17
 To that end, the Heller Court ultimately 
established that statutes which prohibit an operable firearm in the home 
for self-defense violate an individual’s right to bear arms.
18
 Although it 
appeared to be an enormous victory for gun rights lobbyists, the Court 
did not stop there. 
In his majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia specified that the 
Second Amendment is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon 
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”
19
 In 
essence, the Court conferred a right to bear arms upon individuals and 
then limited that right. The majority explained that their opinion should 
not cast doubt on laws that have been in effect for many years and ban 
possession of firearms “by felons and the mentally ill,”
20
 or prohibit 
firearms in specific places such as “schools and government 
buildings,”
21
 or impose “conditions and qualifications on the commercial 
sale of arms.”
22
 Activists would have preferred that the Supreme Court 
did not include what they believe to be an unnecessary “laundry list of 
Second Amendment exceptions,” and, as an executive director with the 
Cato Institute explained, the opinion created “more confusion than 
light.”
23
 
More important than the answers that the Heller Court attempted to 
establish are the ones that the case purposely left unanswered and open 
to interpretation. First, the Court specifically did not establish a standard 
that lower courts could use when interpreting gun control laws, as the 
Court would not definitively state whether gun control laws should be 
viewed under a rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny 
standard.
24
 Second, because the Court’s decision in Heller was about the 
 
16 Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 626. 
20 Id. at 626-27. 
21 Id. 
22 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. 
23 Adam Winkler, The New Second Amendment: A Bark Worse Than Its Right, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/the-new-
second-amendment_b_154783.html. 
24 Perry, supra note 8, at 6. 
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District of Columbia’s federally controlled territory, there was no 
determination as to whether the Second Amendment should apply to the 
gun laws in each state.
25
 Additionally, the Court would not address 
whether its holding limited the Second Amendment solely to self-
defense inside of the home or whether it could be further extended to 
other places, such as public parks or employer parking lots.
26
 
Consequently, the decision in Heller was seen as a “green light” 
for gun rights activists to challenge gun restrictions in states throughout 
the country.
27
 Essentially, every person charged with a crime involving a 
gun “saw the Supreme Court’s decision as a Get out of Jail Free Card.”
28
 
These litigants assumed that the Heller decision gave them the 
opportunity to challenge gun laws that they believed violated their right 
to bear arms. The litigants found support in gun rights activists such as 
the NRA, who began clogging the legal system with gun law challenges 
in an effort to expand the right to bear arms. Unfortunately, the Heller 
decision had not made any definite determination about gun rights 
outside the home and its inconclusiveness has forced the lower courts to 
interpret its holding in countless cases since 2008. 
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago: The Second Amendment 
Applies to the States 
In the midst of the lower court challenges following Heller, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2010 to a case involving a Chicago 
ban on handgun possession by almost all private citizens.
29
 The 
McDonald suit was filed because the petitioners felt that the Chicago 
ban “left them vulnerable to criminals . . . and violated the Second and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”
30
 Because Heller had not reached the issue of 
whether the Second Amendment applies against the states, the Seventh 
Circuit originally upheld the ban as being constitutional.
31
 In support of 
their position, the Seventh Circuit stated that Heller “explicitly refrained 
from opinion on whether the Second Amendment applied to the 
 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Barnes, supra note 6. 
28 Winkler, supra note 23. 
29 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3021 (2010). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
FORSEY NOTE_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  12:57 AM 
2013] STATE LEGISLATURES AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 417 
States.”
32
 The Supreme Court, however, took the discussion much 
further. 
In its majority opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of 
the Seventh Circuit and held that the Second Amendment right to keep 
and bear arms is fully applicable to the States by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
33
 The Court elaborated only slightly on the 
Heller decision, declaring that because Heller protected the right to 
have a gun for self-defense in one’s home, “a provision of the Bill of 
Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an American 
perspective applies equally to the Federal Government and to the 
States.”
34
 This decision was important because it extended “Heller to 
apply to state and local laws nationwide, while again cautioning that 
there are necessary limits on the right to bear arms.”
35
 The key questions 
left open in Heller concerned the level of scrutiny that should be applied 
to Second Amendment challenges, and “whether or to what extent the 
Second Amendment should apply outside of the home.”
36
 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia noted that the majority’s 
approach awards power to people and the democratic process because 
“the rights it fails to acknowledge are left to be democratically adopted 
or rejected by the people, with the assurance that their decision is not 
subject to judicial revision.”
37
 Justice Scalia was correct in his assertion 
that the breadth of the right to bear arms can be and has been decided by 
the legislature in many situations. Only nineteen legislatures, however, 
have given employees more gun rights on their commute to work. The 
lack of judicial affirmance of gun rights has left citizens without very 
much success when attempting to uphold their rights in judicial 
proceedings. When the McDonald Court acknowledged the role that the 
legislatures play in regulating gun possession, they were not making an 
exact determination of gun rights, but rather, they were avoiding the 
controversy altogether. The McDonald Court, as they had done two 
years prior in Heller, refused to establish a standard for gun rights 
litigation or to determine how far gun rights extend, and their limited 
 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 3050. 
34 Id. 
35 Daniel Vice & Kelly Ward, Hollow Victory? Gun Laws Survive Three Years After 
District of Columbia v. Heller, Yet Criminals and the Gun Lobby Continue Their Legal 
Assault (Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence), 2011, at 1. 
36 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 9. 
37 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3058. 
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holding only furthered lower court battles. 
II.  Lower Court Challenges 
The significant questions that were left unresolved have forced the 
post-Heller courts into more than 400 challenges to gun laws by gun 
lobbyists.
38
 Although these challenges generally do not yield positive 
results for the lobbyists,
39
 they continue their assault on gun laws in the 
hopes of gaining more gun rights for individuals. Until the Supreme 
Court takes an affirmative stance on how far Second Amendment rights 
extend outside of the home, lobbyists will continue to use judicial 
resources to litigate gun rights cases. Proponents of gun rights feel as 
though the unanswered questions from the two Supreme Court decisions 
opened the door to challenging gun laws and they continue to assemble 
cases that ask the Supreme Court for further clarification.
40
 
A. Introduction to Federal and State Challenges 
In the months following the decisions in Heller and McDonald, 
federal and state courts struggled with the unresolved questions about 
the latitude and application of the Second Amendment.
41
 Since the 
Heller ruling in 2008, criminals and gun lobbyists alike have joined 
together and “brought more than 400 challenges to gun laws, an average 
of more than two legal challenges every week over the last three 
years.”
42
 Yet, in a majority of instances, the lower courts have denied 
any request for relief in these cases.
43
 Although these challenges in the 
lower courts have generally failed, gun rights advocates continue to 
launch new challenges and do not appear to be giving up their fight 
anytime soon.
44
 
 
 
 
38 Vice, supra note 35, at 1.  
39 Id. 
40 Barnes, supra note 6. 
41 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 2. 
42 Vice, supra note 35, at 1. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
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B. Standards of Review: How Should the Lower Courts 
Evaluate Second Amendment Challenges? 
The Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald did not provide the 
lower courts with any guidance in how to evaluate Second Amendment 
challenges following their decisions;
45
 therefore, the federal and state 
courts have been interpreting what they believe to be the standard of 
scrutiny on a case-by-case basis. Most of the courts that have accepted 
this task have explicitly adopted one of the levels of scrutiny and have 
generally “applied intermediate scrutiny to Second Amendment 
challenges, especially challenges to laws that restrict conduct beyond 
the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess a handgun in 
the home for self-defense.”
46
 At the same time, a few of the courts that 
have taken on the issue have determined that a higher level of scrutiny, 
strict scrutiny, should be used to review Second Amendment 
challenges.
47
 It is clear that without guidance from the Supreme Court, 
lower courts are left with inconsistent rulings regarding what level of 
scrutiny should be applied in Second Amendment cases. 
One example of a court holding that intermediate scrutiny is 
sufficient can be found in Kachalsky v. Cacace, decided by the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
48
 The 
District Court rejected a “Second Amendment challenge to a New York 
law that requires applicants for concealed carry licenses to show ‘proper 
cause.’”
49
 Using a two-pronged test, the Kachalsky court first 
determined whether the law at issue burdened conduct that was 
protected by the Second Amendment, and then applied intermediate 
scrutiny.
50
 In applying the intermediate scrutiny standard, the court 
concluded that the state’s objective of “protecting the public and 
reducing crime is important and that the law is substantially related to 
that objective because, instead of banning all concealed carry, the law 
provides for case specific assessments of each applicant’s needs.”
51
 The 
court refused to apply a strict scrutiny standard instead because it 
 
45 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 8. 
46 Id. (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
47 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 8. 
48 Id. at 3 (citing Kachalsky v. Cacace, No. 10-CV-5413, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99837 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011)). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 3-4 (citing Kachalsky, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS at 99837 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011)). 
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interpreted strict scrutiny to apply only when laws burden what is 
considered a “core” Second Amendment right.
52
 If the Supreme Court in 
Heller or McDonald had set a standard for the lower courts to apply, 
state and federal courts would not have to struggle on a case-by-case 
basis to determine which standard is appropriate.
53
 Instead, a set 
standard would conserve judicial resources and create consistent 
holdings throughout every level of the courts. 
C. Is Conduct Outside of the Home Protected by the Second 
Amendment? 
Heller and McDonald only addressed an individual’s right to self-
defense within the home, so the lower courts have had to decide not 
only the standard to apply, but also the larger question of whether the 
Second Amendment protects conduct outside of one’s home.
54
 In 
evaluating this difficult question, a significant number of courts have 
generally concluded that the Second Amendment only protects conduct 
within the home.
55
 
One such court, the Appellate Court of Illinois, decided in People 
v. Dawson that it would not expand the rights that the Supreme Court 
had announced in Heller and McDonald.
56
 The plaintiff had been 
convicted of “three counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm and two 
counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.”
57
 Plaintiff argued that 
the Supreme Court’s decisions should extend to protect a citizen’s 
ability to carry a handgun outside of their home in case of 
confrontation.
58
 The Appellate Court was left with the responsibility of 
determining the right to bear arms in this case and whether the statute at 
issue violated the Second Amendment.
59
 Noting that the Supreme Court 
“deliberately and expressly maintained a controlled pace of essentially 
 
52 Id. at 4. 
53  See e.g. United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 
2010) (“The court declines to apply strict scrutiny, since … Heller did not expressly find 
firearm possession to be a fundamental right.” (internal citations omitted)). See also Eugene 
Volokh, McDonald v. City of Chicago and the Standard of Review for Gun Control Laws, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2010, 3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/mcdonald-v-
city-of-chicago-and-the-standard-of-review-for-gun-control-laws/.  
54 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 9. 
55 Id. 
56 People v. Dawson, 934 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
57 Id. at 599 (internal citations omitted). 
58 Id. at 604. 
59 Id. at 605. 
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beginning to define this constitutional right[,]” the Appellate Court 
nevertheless created its own interpretation of the Second Amendment 
parameters and construed the statute to be constitutional.
60
 The Dawson 
court acknowledged that the Heller Court had “specifically limited its 
ruling to interpreting the amendment’s protection of the right to possess 
handguns in the home, not the right to possess handguns outside of the 
home in case of confrontation”
61
 and tried to use their own discretion to 
litigate the issue. Without assistance from the Supreme Court, the 
Appellate Court judges were left to “construe statutes to be 
constitutional when possible”
62
 and did not evaluate the plaintiff’s right 
in the manner that it could have with guidance from the Supreme Court. 
Other courts have similarly held off on deciding whether the 
Second Amendment applies outside the home and have found 
restrictions on firearm possession in public places to be valid.
63
 On 
March 24, 2011, the Fourth Circuit rejected a claim that there is a 
constitutional right to possess a loaded handgun in a car in a national 
park in United States v. Masciandaro.
64
 The majority opinion stated that 
the Heller Court did “not define the outer limits of Second Amendment 
rights,” and it also “did not address the level of scrutiny that should be 
applied to laws that burden those rights.”
65
 The court further noted that 
“a considerable degree of uncertainty remains as to the scope of that 
right beyond the home and the standards for determining whether and 
how the right can be burdened by governmental regulation.”
66
 Absent a 
standard from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit applied 
intermediate scrutiny and held that the government has a “substantial 
interest in providing for the safety of individuals who visit and make 
use of the national parks”
67
 and that the statute’s “narrow prohibition is 
reasonably adapted to that substantial governmental interest.”
68
 
 
 
 
60 Id. at 605, 607. 
61 Id. at 605-06. 
62 Dawson, 934 N.E.2d at 605. 
63 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 9. 
64 Vice, supra note 35, at 3 (citing United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 
2011)). 
65 Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 466-67. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 473. 
68 Id. 
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Judge Paul V. Niemeyer wrote separately stating that although he 
did not believe that a car can constitute a “home,” he felt that a plausible 
reading of Heller could be that the Second Amendment nevertheless 
provides a right to possess a loaded handgun for self-defense outside the 
home.
69
 His interpretation of Heller “found that the right included the 
right to ‘protect [] [oneself] against both public and private violence,’ 
thus extending the right in some form to wherever a person could 
become exposed to public or private violence.”
70
 Even though he did not 
agree with Masciandaro’s contention that a car in which an individual 
frequently sleeps can constitute a “home” under Heller, Judge Niemeyer 
nevertheless determined that “because ‘self-defense has to take place 
wherever [a ]person happens to be,’ it follows that the right extends to 
public areas beyond the home.”
71
 Judge Niemeyer did not read Heller 
narrowly to only include self-defense in one’s home, but instead argued 
that the right might extend beyond the home. The complex question of 
where the right actually applies was not necessarily being decided in 
this case, but Judge Niemeyer at the very least believed that the right 
could extend to “Masciandaro’s claim to self-defense—asserted by him 
as a law-abiding citizen sleeping in his automobile in a public parking 
area . . . .”
72
 However, without any guidance from the Supreme Court, 
the Fourth Circuit became yet another lower court that was confined to 
applying a lower standard of scrutiny instead of determining exactly 
how far the Second Amendment right to bear arms extends outside of 
one’s home. 
D. How Are State Courts Reacting to the Assault on their Gun 
Restriction Statutes? 
Ever since the assault on gun restrictions began, state courts have 
been forced into litigation to determine which gun statutes are 
constitutional. These state courts have handed down decisions that 
uphold laws “prohibiting the unlicensed carrying of handguns outside of 
the home, authorizing the seizure of firearms in cases of domestic 
violence, prohibiting the possession of assault weapons and 50-caliber 
rifles, and requiring that an individual possess a license to own a 
 
69 Id. at 467. 
70 Id. (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original). 
71 Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 468 (alteration in original). 
72 Id. 
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handgun.”
73
 In upholding these restrictions, the lower state courts have 
followed the lead of the federal courts and have been unable to resolve 
Heller’s unanswered questions. 
In 2011, the Superior Court of New Jersey was presented with a 
case similar to United States v. Masciandaro.
74
 In State v. Robinson, the 
defendant was convicted of possessing a handgun without a permit and 
the court rejected his Second Amendment challenge to this conviction.
75
 
The defendant was a truck driver who lived in his truck for many days 
due to the distance of his travels; therefore, he argued that his truck was 
a home and should be protected under the holdings in Heller and 
McDonald.
76
 The judges were able to resolve the case without 
determining whether a truck can constitute a legal home.
77
 They noted 
that Heller and McDonald dealt only with guns inside the home and that 
“accept[ing] the defendant’s view of his truck as his second home . . . 
requires acceptance of an expansive definition of the word ‘home . . .’”
78
 
In an effort to avoid deciding how far gun rights extend, the New Jersey 
Superior Court left the issue to be decided at a later time. 
E. Civil Suits Against State and Local Governments 
As of September 1, 2012, states faced fifty significant civil 
lawsuits challenging different state gun laws under the Second 
Amendment.
79
 Although Second Amendment challenges in civil suits 
have generally been unsuccessful, “several courts have cited Heller in 
expressing concern about state action that would limit an individual’s 
right to possess a firearm where that person is not prohibited by law 
from doing so.”
80
 Three significant civil cases have acknowledged the 
individual right to possess a firearm where the individual is legally 
allowed to do so and have joined a minority of cases that have 
 
73 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 7. 
74 Id.at 2. 
75 State v. Robinson, No. A-0280-09T3, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2274 (App. 
Div. Aug. 23, 2011). 
76 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 2. 
77 Id. “Even if we were to accept defendant's view of his truck as his second home, 
which requires acceptance of an expansive definition of the word home, defendant 
acknowledges that he had the handgun and clip in his waistband on his person outside of the 
truck on warehouse property.” Robinson, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2274 at *10. 
78 Robinson, 2011 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2274 at *10. 
79 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, Sept. 1, 
2012, at 5. 
80 Id. at 5-6. 
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proactively litigated Second Amendment claims after Heller. 
One such civil case is Simmons v. Gillespie, in which a plaintiff 
police officer sued a police chief after the chief issued a personnel 
memorandum prohibiting the officer “from possessing or carrying 
firearms without prior authorization from the Chief of Police.”
81
 In his 
complaint, the officer essentially alleged that the chief had “prohibited 
him, as a condition of his employment, from all private, lawful 
possession and use of firearms.”
82
 Even though the officer’s complaint 
did not explicitly include a Second Amendment claim, the court 
believed “it [was] appropriate, in light of Heller’s recent ruling, to 
construe the Complaint as encompassing a Second Amendment claim 
instead of requiring Plaintiff to file an amended Complaint.”
83
 The court 
determined that the plaintiff had a claim to injunctive relief and denied 
the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the Second Amendment claim.
84
 
After settlement negotiations, the court in 2010 granted the plaintiff’s 
Petition for Voluntary Dismissal.
85
 The Simmons court, along with 
several others, was “expressing concern about state action that would 
limit an individual’s right to possess a firearm where that person is not 
prohibited by law from doing so.”
86
 The police chief had tried to limit 
the employee police officer’s possession of a firearm where he was 
lawfully allowed to have it, and the court found that this was a violation 
of the Second Amendment. 
In another potential victory for gun rights lobbyists, the United 
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois in Mischaga v. 
Monken denied the dismissal of a plaintiff’s suit alleging that an Illinois 
licensing law “violated the Second Amendment by preventing her from 
being able to possess a firearm for self-defense while she stayed in an 
Illinois friend’s home.”
87
 In a complaint against the Director of the 
Illinois State Police, the plaintiff alleged that the Illinois Act prohibited 
her from possessing a weapon for her personal protection at her 
temporary residence in Illinois and that the act therefore violated her 
 
81 Simmons v. Gillespie, No. 08-CV-1068, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81424 (C.D. Ill. 
Aug. 1, 2008). 
82 Id. at *4. 
83 Id. at *5 (emphasis omitted). 
84 Id. at *14. 
85 Simmons v. Gillespie, No. 08-CV-1068, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75034 (C.D. Ill., 
July 23, 2010). 
86 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 5. 
87 Id. 
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constitutional right to bear arms.
88
 The court found that the plaintiff had 
stated a claim and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
89
 This case 
discusses the breadth of the word “home” that was left untouched in 
Heller. Since the Supreme Court did not specify how far the right to 
self-defense in the “home” extends, it is significant that the District 
Court did not dismiss a claim alleging that the right should also be 
applied in a temporary home when staying with a friend. 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of Chicago examined a 
Chicago ordinance to determine whether it violated the plaintiff’s 
Second Amendment rights.
90
 Immediately following the decision in 
McDonald, Chicago’s City Council Committee on Police and Fire held 
a hearing to explore what possible legislative responses were needed 
following McDonald.
91
 The Committee made recommendations to the 
City Council, and just four days after McDonald was handed down, 
Chicago’s City Council “repealed the City’s laws banning handgun 
possession and unanimously adopted the Responsible Gun Owners 
Ordinance.”
92
 This ordinance mandates a one-hour range training 
requirement for anyone who wants to own a gun, yet at the same time, it 
prohibits any firing ranges from being within city limits.
93
 The ordinance 
further prohibits any handgun possession “outside the home”
94
 and 
specifies that a gun owner may have “no more than one firearm in his 
home assembled and operable.”
95
 
The Seventh Circuit found Heller to be instructive
96
 and held that 
although the Supreme Court had not specified the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment litigation, its interpretation was 
that Heller required “any heightened standard of scrutiny.”
97
 Because 
the ordinance “prohibits the ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ of 
Chicago from engaging in target practice in the controlled environment 
 
88 Mishaga v. Monken, No. 10-3187, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123491 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 
2010). 
89 Id. 
90 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). 
91 Id. at 690. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 691. 
94 Id. at 690. 
95 Id. at 690-691. 
96 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 700. 
97 Id. at 701. 
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of a firing range,”
98
 the court concluded that the city bears the burden, 
under this heightened level of scrutiny, of “establishing a strong public-
interest justification for its ban on range training.”
99
 The city was 
required to “establish a close fit between the range ban and the actual 
public interest it serves”
100
 and also had to prove that the “public 
interests are strong enough to justify so substantial an encumbrance on 
individual Second Amendment rights.”
101
 When the city failed to meet 
this standard, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for further 
proceedings consistent with its findings. This case recognized the 
Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens and did not allow yet 
another Chicago ban to be upheld. 
F. Going Forward: Further Challenges in Lower Courts 
In the future, gun lobbyists will likely continue to threaten courts 
with more litigation in an effort to keep state and local governments 
across the country from enacting more statutes that restrict gun rights.
102
 
Proponents of increased gun rights have been lining up cases to go to 
the Supreme Court that will force the Court to clarify whether the 
Second Amendment applies outside the context of the home.
103
 
One such case that recently came up before the Supreme Court is 
the appeal of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Masciandaro.
104
 In his petition to the Supreme Court, Sean Masciandaro 
argued that “[i]f there is a Second Amendment right outside of the 
home, it surely applies to law-abiding citizens carrying handguns for 
self-defense while traveling on public highways.”
105
 Masciandaro 
originally pled his case in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
front of Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III, who stated that “any expansion 
of the right in [Heller] would have to come from the Supreme Court.”
106
 
Alan Gura, the litigator who argued the Heller case, wrote an amicus 
brief supporting Masciandaro’s appeal and stated that Masciandaro’s 
 
98 Id. at 708. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 708-709. 
101 Id. at 709. 
102 Post-Heller Litigation Summary, supra note 5, at 9. 
103 Barnes, supra note 6, at 2-3. 
104 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 
U.S.L.W. 3317 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2011) (No. 10-11212). 
105 Barnes, supra note 6, at 2 (internal quotations omitted). 
106 Id. 
FORSEY NOTE_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  12:57 AM 
2013] STATE LEGISLATURES AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 427 
case “provides the perfect chance to ‘clarify’ for recalcitrant lower 
courts that the Second Amendment ‘applies beyond the threshold of 
one’s home.’”
107
 Although the Supreme Court did not take this 
opportunity to clarify its Heller decision, Mr. Gura believes that there 
will surely be more cases like it forthcoming.
108
 
III. Legislative Response: “Guns-at-Work” State Laws Expand 
Gun Rights for Employees 
Rather than bringing cases before the lower courts in the hopes of 
reaching the Supreme Court, lobbyists for the legislatures responded to 
the Heller decision by enacting state “Guns-at-Work” laws. These state 
laws “prohibit employers or business owners from forbidding the 
presence of otherwise legal guns in locked motor vehicles parked on 
business premises.
109
 Since these laws are not preempted by the federal 
OSH Act, the nineteen states that have enacted the “Guns-at-Work” 
laws have essentially expanded gun rights through legislative enactment 
rather than judicial ruling. While the Supreme Court has declined to 
reach the issue of individual gun rights outside of the home, the state 
legislatures have tackled the issue head on and have given individuals 
the right to carry an otherwise lawful weapon for self-defense outside of 
the home. 
A. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Proves 
Inadequate and Ambiguous 
When looking at state legislatures’ reactions to Heller and the 
“Guns-at-Work” laws, we must also look at the federal regulations that 
these laws were meant to clarify, most notably the Federal Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“OSH Act”). When Congress enacted 
the OSH Act in 1970, its restrictions brought the federal government 
into an area that generally was controlled by the states.
110
 Congress 
enacted the law because it wanted to ensure that employees experienced 
safe and healthy working conditions.
111
 Consequently, the Act imposed 
 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 2-3. 
109 Witter, supra note 10, at 240. 
110 Dayna B. Royal, Take Your Gun to Work and Leave It in the Parking Lot: Why the 
OSH Act Does Not Preempt State Guns-at-Work Laws, 61 FLA. L. REV. 475, 486 (2009) 
(quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992)). 
111 Id. at 486. 
FORSEY NOTE_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  12:57 AM 
428 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 37:2 
on employers an obligation to maintain workplace safety.
112
 The two 
main obligations that the Act imposed on employers were compliance 
with health and safety standards and compliance with the Act’s “general 
duty clause.”
113
 This “general duty clause” imposes on every employer a 
duty to “‘furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of 
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or 
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.’”
114
 
The “general duty clause” creates a mandatory requirement for 
employers and functions as a “catch all” for any workplace hazards that 
are not covered by a specific Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) regulation.
115
 
In the context of gun rights, the main speculation about this 
“general duty clause” is whether or not workplace violence prevention 
is required under the clause. Some courts, such as the court in 
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, have found that “‘gun-related workplace 
violence and the presence of unauthorized firearms on company 
property’” qualify as recognized hazards that come under the 
employer’s general duty.
116
 The District Court ruled that the employer’s 
general duty applied because if guns are not banned from the premises, 
including parking lots, disgruntled employees can easily retrieve 
firearms.
117
 However, in Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the ConocoPhillips holding and 
ruled that the OSHA “has not indicated in any way that employers 
should prohibit firearms from company parking lots.”
118
 The court held 
that the OSHA had “declined a request to promulgate a standard 
banning firearms from the workplace”
119
 and although the OSHA is 
aware of the controversy surrounding firearms in the workplace, they 
have “consciously decided not to adopt a standard.”
120
 
Though it would appear that the state “Guns-at-Work” laws 
 
112 Id. at 487. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)). 
115 Perry, supra note 8, at 3. 
116 Id. at 4 (quoting ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F.Supp. 2d 1282, 1328 (N.D. 
Okla. 2007)). 
117 Id.  
118 Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2009) (emphasis 
omitted). 
119 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
120 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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conflict with the OSH Act’s “general duty clause,” that is not the case. 
Employers cannot prevent the random, intentional acts of employees 
and although the OSHA is concerned with increasing workplace safety, 
random acts of violence are not workplace specific.
121
 In an attempt to 
clarify any discrepancies regarding workplace violence, the OSHA 
advised in a letter of interpretation exactly what it meant by the “general 
duty clause.”
122
 The letter stated that where the risk of violence is a 
“recognized hazard,” the employer should take reasonable steps to 
minimize such foreseen risks and would be in violation of the OSH Act 
if he or she did not.
123
 On the other hand, the random occurrences of 
violent acts that are not seen as a characteristic of the type of 
employment do not subject an employer to an OSH Act violation.
124
 This 
letter suggests that employers would not face liability if they had taken 
reasonable steps of abatement, such as installing metal detectors in their 
buildings to prevent guns from coming in places where workplace 
violence is reasonably foreseeable.
125
 Gun activists believe that 
interpreting the OSH Act this way proves not only that the “general 
duty clause” does not require banning guns from employee vehicles, but 
also that the state “Guns-at-Work” laws are not preempted by the 
“general duty clause” of the OSH Act. 
B. State Legislatures Take a Stand: State “Guns-at-Work” Laws 
 1.  “Guns-at-Work” Laws in General 
The spread of “‘parking lot’” or “bring your gun to work” laws 
stems in part from the landmark Heller decision that struck down 
Washington, D.C.’s handgun ban.
126
 Some businesses and employers 
remain unsure about the future of their potential liability, as the 
“policies designed to ensure safe workplaces clash with the Second 
 
121 Royal, supra note 110, at 520-21. 
122 Id. at 521. 
123 Id. (quoting Letter from Roger A. Clark, Dir., Directorate of Enforcement Programs, 
Occupational Safety and Health Admin., to John R. Schuller (Dec. 10, 1992), 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS
&p_id=20951). 
124 Id. 
125 Royal, supra note 110, at 522. 
126 Stephanie Armour, A ‘Bring Your Gun to Work’ Movement Builds, BUSINESSWEEK, 
Mar. 31, 2011, 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_15/b4223038869200.htm. 
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Amendment.”
127
 Employers continue to raise concerns both with their 
duties under the broad “general duty clause” of the OSH Act and also 
with their potential civil liability exposure if an employee is involved in 
workplace violence.
128
 In spite of this uncertainty, some state legislatures 
took a stand for gun rights and passed “Guns-at-Work” laws.
129
 These 
laws have been divided into two categories: the laws with more severe 
restrictions and the laws with weaker exceptions.
130
 The states with the 
most severe restrictions include Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, and Oklahoma.
131
 These states generally forbid employers 
from asking employees whether or not they have a gun inside their car, 
from prohibiting a person that is legally entitled to possess a firearm 
locked in their vehicle from doing so, and from implementing a policy 
that would limit an employee’s ability to store a firearm in their locked 
vehicle.
132
 At the other end of the spectrum, ten states have exceptions to 
the “Guns-at-Work” laws and give employers more leeway in their 
restrictions on employees.
133
 These states include Alaska, Arizona, 
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio, and 
Utah.
134
 
 2.  Oklahoma’s “Guns-at-Work” Law 
Oklahoma’s strict “Guns-at-Work” restrictions have been in the 
spotlight during much of the controversy over these state enactments. 
Oklahoma originally enacted its “Guns-at-Work” statute in response to 
a corporation that fired eight workers at a timber mill in southeastern 
Oklahoma who had guns in their vehicles at the mill in violation of 
company policy.
135
 A principle author of the gun-rights law, Senator 
Jerry Ellis, stated that angry workers who shoot people in the workplace 
 
127 Id. 
128 “Bring Your Gun to Work” Laws & Their Effect on Employers (HRM Partners), 
June 26, 2011, http://hrm-partners.com/hr-news/%e2%80%9cbring-your-gun-to-
work%e2%80%9d-laws-their-effect-on-employers. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. When this publication was written, Maine had not yet joined the other sixteen 
legislatures in passing the “Guns-at-work” law. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 HRM Partners, supra note 128.  
135 Robert Boczkiewicz, Gun Law Gets its Day in Court, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 20, 2008, 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?articleID20081120_11_A1_DENVER94063. 
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“are going to do so no matter what laws are enacted.”
136
 
Oklahoma’s “Guns-at-Work” law has sparked much controversy 
and litigation. In the case of Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit “unanimously ruled that workers 
in Oklahoma have the constitutional right to keep guns in their vehicles 
parked on their employers’ parking lots.”
137
 Originally, a group of 
employers had filed a lawsuit arguing that the state laws violated the 
regulations of the OSH Act and although the district court in 2007 
agreed, the Tenth Circuit held that the OSHA regulations are just 
“voluntary guidelines and recommendations for employers seeking to 
reduce the risk of workplace violence in at-risk industries.”
138
 Because of 
the number of cases that have already surrounded the “Guns-at-Work” 
laws, it is no surprise that labor and employment attorney James P. 
Anelli predicts that, even though this decision was a victory for 
employees in the Tenth Circuit, there will be even more cases down the 
road where employees will fight for their constitutional right.
139
 Anelli 
proposes that in states without the “Guns-at-Work” laws, employees 
may argue “that he or she has a constitutional right to carry a firearm in 
a vehicle [in an employer parking lot], particularly in a state where it’s 
legal to carry a firearm in one’s vehicle.”
140
 In order to avoid the 
continued litigation on the subject, the Supreme Court needs to make a 
ruling that either affirms or denies an individual’s right to bear arms not 
only locked in their vehicle at work, but also outside of the home in 
general. 
 3.  Florida’s Legislation 
Akin to Oklahoma, Florida adopted “Guns-at-Work” legislation 
that severely limits the restrictions employers can place on employees 
regarding guns in locked vehicles in company parking lots. Prior to 
adopting this legislation,
141
 the bill’s sponsor, Rep. Dennis Baxley, 
argued that the bill was simply “an extension of the Second Amendment 
rights” and was “meant to protect employees during their commute to 
 
136 Id. 
137 Lydell C. Bridgeford, Court Rejects Ban on Guns in Workplace Parking Lots, 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, June 15, 2009, http://ebn.benefitnews.com/news/court-reject-
bans-on-guns-in-workplace-parking-lots-2681024-1.html. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 H.B. 129, 108th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006). 
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and from their place of business.”
142
 Baxley, the owner of a company 
with close to seventy employees, further explained that although he 
understood the concerns business owners had, he didn’t believe that the 
employer’s property rights could trump the individual’s Second 
Amendment rights to self-protection.
143
 In 2008, the Florida “Guns-at-
Work” statute was enacted.
144
 It specifically “prohibits employers from 
preventing customers, employees, or invitees from possessing legally 
owned firearms locked in vehicles in parking lots when lawfully in the 
area.”
145
 Under the statute, employers cannot take action against 
employees based on statements about firearms they may have in their 
vehicles, and employers cannot condition employment on an agreement 
not to maintain such firearms.
146
 
In Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen.,
147
 the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Florida was asked to determine whether 
Florida’s “Guns-at-Work” statute was preempted by the OSH Act.
148
 
Finding that the statute was not preempted, the district court concluded 
that the OSH Act applies to permit the states to regulate
149
 and generally 
acknowledged that state laws can be used to decide any occupational 
safety or heath issue when there is no controlling federal standard.
150
 
This is extremely important because the court essentially ruled that the 
OSH Act left the task of governing the possession of guns in the 
workplace to the states. Because there is not a federal standard 
“governing the prevention of workplace violence relevant to ‘guns-at-
work’ laws,” the statute as enacted in Florida is permitted.
151
 
 
 
142 Kasey Wehrum, Debate Rages Over Guns at Work: A New Bill That Would Forbid 
Employers From Banning Guns is Drawing Fire, INC., Feb. 10, 2006, 
http://www.inc.com/news/articles/200602/guns.html. 
143 Id. 
144 Fla. Stat. §790.251(4)(a) (2010). 
145 Royal, supra note 110, at 496 (quoting Fla. Stat §790.251(4)(a) (2010)). 
146 Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. §790.251(4)(a) (2010)). 
147 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
148 Royal, supra note 110, at 505. 
149 Id. at 506 (quoting Fla. Retail Fed., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1298-99). 
150 Id. at 508 (see 29 U.S.C. §667 (a) and Occupational and Safety and Health Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, §18(a)). 
151 Id. 
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 4.  Indiana: Parking Lot 2.0 
Despite criticism from businesses and major employers, Indiana’s 
“Guns-at-Work” statute went into effect on July 1, 2010 after sailing 
through both legislative chambers.
152
 Indiana Governor Mitchel Daniels 
stated that he signed the legislation because of the “clear gun-rights 
language in federal and state constitutions and the ‘overwhelming 
consensus’ in the House and Senate.”
153
 He did, however, add that the 
General Assembly “might consider ironing out ambiguities to prevent 
unnecessary litigation.”
154
 Unlike the Supreme Court, Daniels wanted to 
clarify any unanswered questions that the legislation would bring about 
in order to save judicial resources. 
In 2011, the NRA pushed for new legislation that would allow 
employers “to be sued if they require applicants to disclose information 
about gun ownership or require employees to reveal if they have 
weapons or ammunition in their cars.”
155
 The bill was authored by State 
Senator Johnny Nugent and labeled “the Parking Lot 2.0 bill” by the 
NRA.
156
 Senator Nugent explained his support of the bill by stating that 
although he understands why employers feel the way they do, there are 
“things that trump property rights, and one of them is the defense of 
[my] life.”
157
 The 2010 bill failed to specifically address what employers 
could do “to find out if their workers had guns in their cars, or what 
action they could take to verify those guns were legally permitted.”
158
 
Employers were taking advantage of the vague statute and creating 
separate parking areas for employers who carried guns to work in their 
cars and even began asking employees for more information about the 
guns that they were bringing.
159
 The NRA lobbyists argued that citizens 
“have a constitutional right to self-protection that doesn’t stop when 
 
152 Norm Heikens, What’s next for guns at work, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., Mar. 19, 2010, 
http://www.ibj.com/newstalk/2010/03/19/newstalk-template/PARAMS/post/18801. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Maureen Hayden, Challenges Arise to Indiana’s ‘Parking Lot’ Gun Law: Bill 
Targets Employers Who Demand Info From Employees, TRIBSTAR, Jan. 28, 2011, 
http://tribstar.com/indianalegislature/x135630126/Challenges-arise-to-Indiana-s-parking-lot-
gun-law. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
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they drive onto their employer’s property”
160
 and subsequently pushed 
for the more restrictive “Parking Lot 2.0” bill. On April 15, 2011, 
Governor Daniels signed into law the Senate Enrolled Act 411 (known 
as the “Parking Lot 2.0” bill).
161
 
Indiana’s new employee protection legislation “prevents workplace 
discrimination for those employees who exercise their Second 
Amendment rights before and after work.”
162
 With this new statute, 
businesses and employers can no longer ask their employees about 
“private firearm ownership habits or what firearms or ammunition they 
own or transport in their vehicle” and cannot force “vehicle searches 
and the registration of employee firearm serial numbers.”
163
 There was 
no serious opposition for the new bill in the state Senate or House, and 
it went into effect on July 1, 2011.
164
 By enacting this statute, the state 
legislature stood up for Second Amendment rights of employees to 
protect themselves on their commute to and from work. 
IV. Conclusion: The Supreme Court Needs to Take an 
Affirmative Stance 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution states “a 
well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
165
 
There are two different ways that citizens have interpreted these words: 
(1) that individuals have an unfettered right to own firearms; or (2) that 
states are merely able to maintain militias in order to protect against a 
tyrannical federal government.
166
 Until 2008, the Supreme Court had not 
ruled on this controversy. However, in Heller, the Court held that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms. This 
brought about not only increasing gun rights litigation, but also 
numerous state laws giving employees the right to store otherwise legal 
 
160 Id. 
161 Indiana: Governor Mitch Daniels Signs “Parking Lot 2.0” Bill Into Law!, 
NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION,  Apr. 19, 
2011, http://www.nraila.org/legislation/state-legislation/2011/4/indiana-governor-mitch-
daniels-signs-
%E2%80%9C.aspx?s=%22Parking+Lot%2FEmployee+Protection%22&st=&ps=. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 U.S. Const. amend. II. 
166 Perry, supra note 8, at 5. 
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handguns in their vehicles when parked in their employer’s private lots. 
Gun-rights lobbyists believe that Heller supports an expansive reading 
of the Second Amendment, and have been attempting to convince 
judges and state legislatures to read the decision expansively as well.
167
 
The Heller and McDonald decisions have played key roles in both the 
state “Guns-at-Work” statutes and the recent litigation that continues to 
challenge gun restrictions nationwide. If not for both of these decisions, 
advocates of the “Guns-at-Work” laws would not have much of a leg to 
stand on when arguing their rights under the Second Amendment. 
Even with legislative enactments expanding gun rights at the 
workplace, the Supreme Court needs to better define Second 
Amendment rights in order to put an end to the costly litigation created 
by Heller’s unanswered questions. If the Supreme Court meant its two 
holdings to apply beyond possession of a firearm in one’s home, it will 
need to state that outright rather than avoid the subject.
168
 It was clear 
from the moment the decision was handed down that “much litigation 
would be needed to define the contours of Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
majority opinion in Heller.”
169
 The Supreme Court cannot simply give a 
limited definition to Second Amendment rights and then wait while the 
lower courts argue back and forth, draining judicial resources and 
providing inconsistent holdings. After taking a stance in both Heller and 
McDonald, the Supreme Court needs to take their holding a step further 
and define how far the right to bear arms extends outside of the home. 
During the ongoing litigation stemming from Heller and 
McDonald, state legislatures in Indiana, Florida, Oklahoma, and 
fourteen other states have chosen not to rely on previous federal 
enactments such as the OSH Act and instead have created their own 
statutes that protect gun rights for self-defense outside of the home. 
They have chosen to take the power that the Supreme Court has so far 
refused to exercise and have expanded Second Amendment rights to 
include self-defense outside of the home by permitting employees to 
possess guns in their car during their commute to the workplace. 
Currently, nineteen states have “Guns-at-Work” statutes and there is no 
telling what other legislation will come into effect due to pressures from 
gun rights activists. With this type of disconnect between judicial 
rulings and the legislatures’ approaches, it is important that the Supreme 
 
167 Witter, supra note 10, at 240. 
168 Barnes, supra note 6. 
169 Id. 
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Court accept one of the many cases being petitioned before it and take 
the opportunity to define exactly how far the individual’s right to bear 
arms extends. Due to the overwhelming need for clarification in the 
judicial branch, the Supreme Court needs to follow the state 
legislatures’ example and take an affirmative position on this significant 
Second Amendment issue. 
 
